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Within contemporary science, it is common practice to compare data points 
to the average, i.e., to the statistical mean. Because this practice is so familiar, 
it might at first appear not to be the sort of thing that requires explanation. 
But recent research in cognitive science gives us reason to adopt the opposite 
perspective. Research on the cognitive processes involved in people’s 
ordinary efforts to make sense of the world suggests that, instead of using a 
purely statistical notion of the average, people tend to use a value-laden 
notion of the normal. This finding about ordinary cognition gives us reason 
to rethink certain familiar facts about scientific practice. In particular, it 
suggests that the fact that scientists so often make use of the statistical 
average should be seen as a highly surprising fact, the sort of thing that calls 
out for explanation. To understand it, we turn to work in the history of 
science, and especially to work on the ways in which the practice of science 
changed over the course of the 19th century. 
 
Looking at the practices at work in contemporary science, one obvious and seemingly 
unremarkable fact is that scientists often compare data points to the average, i.e., to the statistical mean. 
This practice plays an absolutely central role in everyday statistical analysis. Indeed, it is such a 
commonplace part of scientific practice that it is easy to find oneself taking it for granted and not 
regarding it as worthy of explanation or exploration. 
But now suppose we look instead at research in cognitive science on the processes that take 
place within people’s minds ordinarily as they are trying to make sense of the world. Strikingly, this 
research indicates that people do not ordinarily understand data points by comparing them to the 
statistical average. Instead, people seem to employ a more value-laden notion of the normal (Bear & 
Knobe, 2017; Hitchcock & Halpern, 2014; Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; Icard et al., 2017; Kominsky et 
al., 2015; Wysocki, 2020). As we will see, people’s ordinary notion of the normal differs in important 
respects from the notion of the statistical average. Existing research in cognitive science has therefore 
explored the ordinary notion of the normal as part of an attempt to understand questions about the 
mind (see, e.g., Bear et al., 2020; Egré & Cova, 2015; Knobe & Samuels, 2013). 
 
1 We are very grateful to Kathryn Tabb for valuable comments on a previous version. 
2 
Our aim in this paper is to bring together the literature on practices taking place in systematic 
science with this literature on processes taking place within the mind. We argue that findings about 
the mind can teach us that certain facts about scientific practices that might initially seem perfectly 
obvious or unremarkable should actually be seen as highly surprising. One of these facts, we argue, is 
the fact that scientists compare data points to the average. This practice represents a substantial 
departure from the processes found in ordinary cognition, and it is worth thinking in detail about how 
scientific practice came to depart from people’s ordinary understanding in this respect. 
We then suggest that this divergence between scientific practice and ordinary understanding 
is best understood from a historical perspective. Research in the history of science points to striking 
changes in scientific practices over the course of the 19th century. We will argue that the practice of 
comparing data points to the average arose as part of that much larger change. At the beginning of 
the 19th century, scientists were often relying on the ordinary notion of the normal, but by the end, 
things had changed considerably. Statistical and other innovations during that time period had made 
possible an importantly different set of practices.  
If this claim does turn out to be correct, it does not answer the question about how to explain 
divergence between the practices of science and that processes occurring ordinarily in the mind. 
Instead, it deepens that question. One wants to know why the change first arose and how it is sustained 
within everyday scientific practice. We do not have definitive answers to these questions, but we will 
be suggesting some hypotheses that might be worth investigating. 
Although we will be focusing very specifically on questions about the average and the normal, 
our inquiry is clearly related to much broader questions about the relationship between philosophy of 
science and philosophy of mind. Within existing philosophy of science, there has been an enormous 
amount of research on the role that value judgments play in contemporary scientific practice. The 
present paper takes up a new approach to that traditional question. We look at the role that value 
judgments play ordinarily in people’s minds, then argue that the role they play in scientific practice is 
importantly different from the role they play in ordinary cognition. Ultimately, then, our goal is to 
shed light on contemporary scientific practice by looking at the ways in which it differs from ordinary 
cognition — in other words, by addressing the role of values in contemporary science indirectly, through 
attention to ordinary cognition today and scientific work in the past. 
 
1. Two Approaches to the Study of Values in Science  
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Let’s begin, then, by situating our exploration within a broader context in the history and 
philosophy of science. We will be concerned here with questions about the role of value judgments in 
the practice of science, but will be pursuing this question in a slightly different way from the one that 
has become most common within existing research. We therefore begin by drawing a distinction 
between the traditional approach to research on this topic (what we call the ‘direct approach’) and the 
approach we will be pursuing here (which we will call the ‘indirect approach’). 
 
1.1. The Direct Approach  
The direct approach aims to characterize the way that contemporary science actually works. 
Research conducted via this approach has uncovered numerous important features of contemporary 
science. These features have often come as a surprise to people who are not already intimately familiar 
with the workings of contemporary science, and in many cases, they would be extremely difficult to 
discern even for people who are engaged in the practice of science every day.  
Work within this first approach has provided a series of powerful arguments for the claim that 
value judgments play an important role in contemporary science. Researchers have argued that value 
judgments play a role in deciding how much evidence one needs before arriving at a conclusion in a 
given domain (Hempel, 1965; Rudner 1953) that some of the concepts used in social science are 
irreducibly value-related (e.g., Dupre, 2012); that values (help) determine how one makes sense of 
scientific results (Barnes, 1977); that value judgments play a role in how scientists choose between 
different modes of explanation (Longino, 1990); and that epistemic and non-epistemic values cannot 
be cleanly separated and inevitably end up influencing each other (Kitcher, 2003). Work in this vein 
continues up until the present day. For a sophisticated recent discussion, see Douglas (2009). 
Abstracting away from the details of the individual arguments, let’s offer a brief 
characterization of the importance of the direct approach to values in contemporary science as a 
whole. Much of the work in this area provides arguments for the thesis: 
(Value-Ladenness) Value judgments play an important role in contemporary science. 
This thesis can be contrasted with an opposing opinion about the lack of a role for value judgements 
in science:  
(Value-Freedom) Value judgments do not play an important role in contemporary science. 
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To the extent that one started out with the assumption of Value-Freedom, it would be quite surprising 
to read work motivating Value-Ladenness. The history of the philosophy of science suggests that this 
assumption was prevalent among practitioners as recently as the mid-twentieth century, and that the 
arguments for Value-Ladenness cited above were surprising and controversial when published 
(Zammito 2004). Indeed, insofar as many people presume or expect Value-Freedom, arguments for 
Value-Ladenness remain both surprising and important (Oreskes & Conway 2010). 
We mention this direct approach to values in contemporary science only to distinguish it from 
the project we will be pursuing here. Our project will not contribute anything new to this first stream 
of research. We will not be arguing either that the contemporary scientific notion of the average is 
value-free or that it is value-laden. Instead, we pursue an indirect approach. 
 
1.2. The Indirect Approach  
The indirect approach aims to shed light on the workings of contemporary science by 
exploring other ways of making sense of the world. While such work could take a number of forms, 
we will be focusing especially on cognitive science and history of science. 
In a certain sense, the indirect approach also reveals surprising facts about contemporary 
science, but it does so in a very different way. It is not that the indirect approach teaches us new facts 
about how contemporary science works. Rather, the indirect approach takes facts we already knew 
about contemporary science and provides evidence that these facts should actually be seen as 
surprising. It does this by synthesizing work on adjacent modes of thinking to which contemporary 
science is frequently compared.  
The best way to get a sense for this kind of research is not to describe it in general but rather 
to consider a prominent example. Consider work on teleological explanation. People tend to explain some 
things in terms of purposes while explaining other things in ways that do not involve purposes. In 
contemporary science, it is considered appropriate to explain the existence of certain objects in terms 
of purposes (chairs, buildings) but to explain others in ways that do not involve purposes (mountains, 
oceans). Research within cognitive science and history of science shows, however, that other modes 
of thought yield very different explanations of these phenomena. Cognitive scientists find that non-
scientists seem drawn to give teleological explanations for phenomena that scientists explain non-
teleologically. For example, one finds such explanations in children, in people with Alzheimer’s, and 
even in trained scientists when they are forced to respond under extreme time pressure (Kelemen, 
Rottman & Seston, 2013; Lombrozo, Kelemen & Zaitchik, 2007). Similarly, historians of science have 
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shown that teleology gave way to alternatives only recently, in the life sciences and elsewhere (Lenoir 
1982; Riskin 2016). Taken together, this information leaves us with a very different understanding of 
the non-teleological explanations that are so often found in contemporary science. In other words, we 
might already have known that contemporary science attempts to explain the existence of mountains 
in ways that do not involve purposes (even if it sometimes fails). But after learning more about 
cognitive science and the history of science, we come to see that it is actually surprising that scientists 
use non-teleological explanations—and that we might want to figure out how, and why, they do so. 
Our project adopts a similar approach to the use of the statistical average in contemporary 
science. We argue that it should be seen as surprising that value judgments do not play the same role 
in the use of this notion that they play in the notion of the normal that is so prominent both in people’s 
ordinary cognition and in earlier scientific thinking. In other words, our aim is to take certain facts 
that you already knew about contemporary science and argue that these facts should be regarded as 
deeply surprising relative to facts about other ways of thinking.  
Although our focus in what follows will be specifically on questions about the average and the 
normal, we will be drawing heavily on ideas from broader literatures on how contemporary science 
differs from other modes of thought. On one hand, we draw from the literature in cognitive science 
on the ways in which value judgments can impact a wide variety of different ordinary judgments. On 
the other, we draw from a broader literature in the history of science on the ways in which the role of 
value judgment in the practice of science changed over the course of the 19th century. 
Recent work in cognitive science on the role of value judgments has shown that they have a 
far greater and more pervasive impact on their cognition than one might initially suppose. For 
example, one might initially think that people’s moral values would impact their judgments about a 
certain range of questions (questions about how to live, questions about whether agents deserve praise 
or blame) but that there would be plenty of questions that people answer using cognitive processes 
that are unaffected by moral values (e.g., straightforwardly factual questions about whether one event 
caused another). Of course, one would not be surprised to find occasional exceptions to this 
generalization. There might be various unusual circumstances in which people's value judgments do 
end up impacting their intuitions about what seem like purely factual questions. Still, one might expect 
that, for the most part, the role of value judgment would be relatively circumscribed, with value 
judgments having an impact on the way people think about some questions but not others. 
A large body of research over the past decade or so has challenged this assumption. This 
research suggests that people's moral judgments can actually impact their way of thinking about a wide 
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variety of questions that might initially appear to be purely factual or value-neutral. Such questions 
include: whether one event caused another (Halpern & Hitchcock, 2014; Hitchcock, & Knobe, 2009; 
Kominsky, Phillips, Gerstenberg, Lagnado & Knobe, 2015), whether an agent acted intentionally 
(Knobe, 2010), whether an agent has knowledge of a proposition (Beebe & Buckwalter, 2010), 
whether an agent is happy (Phillips, De Freitas, Mott, Gruber & Knobe, 2017), whether an event is 
possible (Phillips & Cushman, 2017) or probable (Dalbauer & Hergovich, 2013)).  
Considerable controversy remains about how to explain these effects (e.g., Alicke, Rose, & 
Bloom, 2011; Samland & Waldmann, 2016; Uttich & Lombrozo, 2010), but we will not be weighing 
in on that controversy here. For our purposes, the key point is not that these effects are best explained 
by one or another specific cognitive process, but rather just that the effects themselves truly do exist. 
This point has by now been amply confirmed by a wide-ranging research program in psychology and 
experimental philosophy. 
Something similar is true of the work on values in the history of science. Over the last few 
decades, historians have shown just how important value judgments were in some of science’s most 
canonical debates and discoveries. One of the most influential examples of this line of research is 
Shapin and Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air-Pump, which argued that a key debate in the Scientific 
Revolution was as much about the competing values of practitioners as it was about the theories and 
practices involved (Shapin and Schaffer 2011 [1985]). Similar arguments have been made about 
Enlightenment chemistry (Golinski 1992), Victorian physics (Smith 1999), and cognitive science 
(Cohen-Cole 2014), among many, many other topics. Much like work in philosophy of science, these 
historical books push back against the once-common assumption that modern science is completely 
value-neutral. Instead, historians have shown how values of many sorts played surprising roles in 
judgments about truth, evidence, causality, and other supposedly value-free domains.  
Historians have also shown how the role of values has changed over time. While scholars hold 
different views about the exact nature of these changes, most seem to agree that a major shift in the 
ideal of value-neutrality among scientific practitioners took place during the nineteenth century. 
Explicit attempts to address the role of values qua values in science had increased markedly by the end 
of the nineteenth century (Proctor 1991). Alongside the value-neutral ideal arose what Theodore 
Porter has called “trust in numbers”: deference to quantitative expertise that continues to characterize 
both science and politics today (Porter 1995b). The power of numbers was mirrored by the rise of 
what Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison have called “mechanical objectivity”: efforts at self-denial 
among scientists that aimed to replace human judgment with observation aided by machines (Daston 
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& Galison 2007). Though these authors disagree about causes, they agree that the role of values in 
science fundamentally changed in the nineteenth century. 
This shift was far-reaching, affecting everything from technical practice and training to primary 
education and the public understanding of science. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, it was 
still common for scientific thinkers to invoke value-laden notions of divine power; by the end of the 
century, this was much less common in scientific circles and at the research universities that emerged 
over this same period (Gregory 1992; Lenoir 1997). Of course, the relationship between science and 
values does not reduce to that between science and religion (Harrison 2015), but the two were caught 
up together in the nineteenth century. This is perhaps clearest in Max Weber’s famous essay on 
“Science as a Vocation,” in which he argued for the separation of science and religion and insisted 
that “whenever the man of science introduces his personal value judgment, a full understanding of 
the facts ceases” (Weber 1946 [1917]). Whatever one thinks of Weber’s claim, it encapsulated a view 
that dominated scientific thinking by the early-twentieth century and continues to guide scientific 
practice and pedagogy today. 
  In short, existing research provides powerful evidence for the claim that there is some 
important difference between the role that value judgments play in contemporary science and the role 
they play in ordinary cognition and in the science of earlier periods. Our aim now is to apply this more 
general idea to the specific case of the average and the normal. 
 
2. The Average and Normal  
It is common practice within contemporary science to compare quantities to some measure 
of central tendency. One can compare quantities to the median or to the mode, but the most common 
approach is to compare quantities to the average (the mean). Thus, when one wants to make sense of 
the values of a given variable, one often proceeds by representing them in terms of the degree to 
which they are higher or lower than the average. 
To illustrate, suppose that you have collected information about how much TV certain people 






Another approach, however, would be to represent each amount in comparison to the average. To do 
this, one computes the average and then subtract that amount from each data point. In the present 





This transformation is referred to as ‘centering,’ and scientists use it all the time when trying to 
understand patterns of data. 
Taking things just a little bit farther, we might then divide each number by the standard 





This transformation is known as ‘standardizing’ or, in a telling phrase, ‘normalizing.’ It plays an 
absolutely foundational role in the field of statistics as currently practiced. 
Before proceeding any further, it might be helpful to emphasize that the point we are making 
here is very different from the kinds of points one usually finds in philosophical work on values in 
science. Within the existing literature, there is a tendency to focus on aspects of scientific practice that 
are not at all obvious and can only be revealed through serious empirical and conceptual research (e.g., 
Douglas, 2009). By contrast, the point we are making is one that would usually be regarded as entirely 
uninteresting. All we are saying is that scientists often make use of a particular statistical procedure. 
This procedure is widely taught in introductory statistics courses, and scientists invoke it quite 
explicitly all the time. No real insight or sophistication is required to see it at work. 
Our aim is to show that this seemingly uninteresting aspect of contemporary science should 
actually be regarded as highly surprising and worthy of further exploration. The argument relies on a 
comparison between contemporary science and two other modes of thought. 
 
2.1. Normality in cognitive science 
To begin with, we can ask about the relationship between the precise statistical concept of the 
average and people's ordinary ways of making sense of the world. One possible hypothesis would be 
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that the precise statistical concept is best understood as providing a more formal version of the sorts 
of notions people in ordinary cognition. People might not ordinarily go through the steps necessary 
to precisely calculate the average, but they do have an intuitive sense that certain quantities are normal. 
For example, we might have an intuitive sense for the ‘normal amount of TV.’ Then we might classify 
other amounts in terms of their relationship to the normal (‘a little bit less than normal,’ ‘far greater 
than normal’). One hypothesis would be that statistical concepts just give us a more precise, formal 
way of spelling out these ordinary notions. Thus, one might think that a statistical concept like a z-
score of 2 is best understood as simply spelling out more precisely the very same thing we might 
express in a vague, intuitive manner by using an expression like ‘much more than normal.’ 
Recent work in cognitive science shows that this hypothesis is mistaken. People’s ordinary 
thought does seem to include a notion of the normal that in some ways resembles a statistical measure 
of central tendency, but this ordinary notion appears to differ from the average in one very important 
respect. Specifically, recent empirical studies suggest that the ordinary (as opposed to the scientific) 
understanding of normality is value-laden (Bear & Knobe, 2017; Egré & Cova, 2015; Hitchcock & 
Halpern, 2014; Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; Icard, Kominsky & Knobe, 2017; Kominsky, Phillips, 
Gerstenberg, Lagnado & Knobe, 2015; Wysocki, 2020). People’s intuitions about which quantity 
counts as normal are not simply sensitive to their statistical beliefs — “normal” is not simply a 
synonym for “average” — but are also sensitive to people's beliefs about the degree to which quantities 
would be good or bad from a more evaluative standpoint. 
To get a sense for this phenomenon, consider again the case of amounts of TV. In a recent 
study, one group of participants were asked to guess the average amount of TV people watch per day 
(a statistical judgment), while another was asked about the ideal amount of TV to watch per day (a 
value judgment). Unsurprisingly, participants gave a quite high amount for the average and a much 
lower amount for the ideal. A third group of participants was then asked about the normal amount of 
TV to watch in a day. The results show that people’s judgments about the normal were not simply 
identical to their judgments about the average. Rather, the perceived normal amount was intermediate 
between the average and the ideal. This pattern of judgments did not arise only for the case of TV; it 
arose systematically across a wide variety of quantities, including everything from amounts of exercise 
for a person to do in a week to percentages of students to be bullied in a middle school (Bear & 
Knobe, 2017). The pattern as a whole suggests that people’s notion of the normal is shaped by a 
mixture of statistical and evaluative considerations. 
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This same basic effect has emerged in studies using many other methodologies. For example, 
another study showed that participants’ judgments about whether a particular political view was 
normal do not depend only on the statistical prevalence of that view. Rather, each participant's 
judgment depends in part on whether that participant regards the view itself as good or bad (Wysocki, 
2020). 
Difficult questions arise about precisely how people integrate statistical judgments and value 
judgment into an overall judgment of normality. It is clear that people’s ordinary notion of normality 
somehow brings together judgments about what is statistically average with judgments about what is 
evaluatively ideal, but it is not yet clear exactly how to understand this more integrated notion. Yet, 
regardless of how these difficult questions are resolved, it seems that the scientific concept of the 
average is importantly different from the ordinary notion of normality. Perhaps it can be shown that 
value judgments play some role in people’s way of understanding the average, but they do not seem 
to play the role that is characteristic of normality judgments. To the extent that a person has the 
relevant knowledge, she can take a list of numbers and, without making any further value judgment, 
calculate the average using a straightforward mathematical procedure.  
With this framework in place, let’s consider again people’s ordinary ways of comparing 
quantities to a standard. To say that a quantity counts as (for example) ‘large’ or ‘small,’ we need to 
compare the quantity in question to some standard (Kennedy, 2013). But what standard do people 
use? One obvious hypothesis would be that people compare quantities to the average. For example, 
it might be thought that people would see someone as watching a ‘large amount of TV’ when the 
amount that person watches is sufficiently above the average (say, anything higher than z = 1). 
However, existing studies suggest that this is not the case. Instead, people seem to regard a quantity 
as large when it is larger than their undifferentiated representation of the normal (Egré & Cova, 2015). 
Thus, the threshold one needs to surpass to count as watching a ‘large amount of TV’ is not the 
statistical average but a value-laden notion of the normal (Bear & Knobe, 2017). Similar effects have 
been observed for numerous other psychological phenomena. The notion of normality has been 
implicated in people’s intuitions about prototypicality, causation, even the folk-biological concept of 
innateness. In all of these cases, studies show that people’s intuitions are not shaped solely by statistical 
considerations. Rather, people’s intuitions appear to be shaped in each case by a mixture of statistical 
and evaluative considerations (Barsalou, 1985; Bear & Knobe, 2017; Icard et al., 2017; Knobe & 
Samuels, 2013; Kominsky et al., 2015). Thus, the available evidence suggests that people’s integrated 
statistical/evaluative notion of normality plays a pervasive role in cognition.  
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These facts about people’s ordinary understanding give us reason to adopt a different view of 
the scientific practice of comparing data points to the average. This concept plays such an important 
role in our scientific practices that it is easy to take it for granted, and it might be difficult to see this 
concept as involving any kind of important innovation. However, existing studies suggest that the 
concept of an average actually involves a fundamental departure from people’s ordinary mode of 
thought.  
 
2.2. Normality in the History of Science.  
To understand how the descriptive notion of the average departs from the evaluative notion 
of the normal, it is instructive to study not only how far apart they are in the present, but also how 
they came apart in the past. As with the case of cognitive science, history suggests that ideas about 
normality in contemporary science are relatively value-free and should be regarded as surprising, given 
the value-laden history of their usage and development in the nineteenth century.  
Historians of science have highlighted stages in the history of normality, from the early 
development of “political arithmetic” in the seventeenth century (Deringer 2018) through the advent 
of classical probability in the eighteenth century (Daston 1988) to the rise of statistical thinking in the 
nineteenth century (Porter 1986). In 1800, depending on the field you were in and the questions you 
asked, it might have made sense to invoke value-laden ideas of “normality” when describing the 
natural world, but by 1900 a more value-neutral statistical notion of “the average” had taken over in 
most fields. This transformation occurred in different ways in different areas, but the general trend 
was to invoke a value-neutral meaning of “normal” as part of a more general movement to scrub 
values from science. Ian Hacking has called this process “the taming of chance”: that is, the separation 
of statistical terms for describing the world from value judgments of (and value-laden terms for) 
whatever was being described (Hacking 1990).  
It can be instructive to review a specific case. Evaluative and descriptive meanings of 
“normality” were intertwined in the field of medicine during the nineteenth century. Physicians held 
“the normal state” to be a healthy one—bodies operating at a temperature and a rhythm conducive 
to the functions of whatever organ or organism was being observed. The opposite of “the normal,” 
as Georges Canguilhem famously showed, was “the pathological,” and in this context it was clear that 
one was to be preferred and one avoided (1991 [1943]). In medicine, this value-laden meaning has 
stuck with “normality.” This persistence is illustrated by the common question: “Doc, is this normal?” 
A positive answer is calming, a negative one cause for concern. According to Canguilhem, this value-
12 
laden sense of “normality” is inevitable in both medicine and physiology. “It seems to us,” he 
concluded, “that physiology has better to do than to search for an objective definition of the normal, 
and that is to recognize the original normative character of life.” 
Even if the value-laden meaning of “normal” played an important role in medicine through 
the twentieth century (Wellman 1958) up to the present (Manrai 2018), its importance and role 
changed during the nineteenth century. The rise of “scientific medicine” meant, in part, aspirational 
identification with an approach to the “normal” that was increasingly statistical alone. Whether or not 
this was achieved (Tiles 1993), normality’s changing meaning produced tension and debate in the 
changing medical landscape of the nineteenth century.  
One way to trace this is in the development of so-called “normal curves” and their application 
to human affairs. The use of “normal curves” originated with Pierre-Simon Laplace and Johann Carl 
Friedrich Gauss, two mathematicians who plotted the distribution of observations of a given data 
point in order to reduce error and arrive at the true value. The original “normal curve” was thus a plot 
of human errors, not of natural phenomena. Gradually, however, this pattern was reimagined as a part 
of nature itself—the distribution of observational errors was transposed onto the things that were 
being observed, natural and human alike (Hacking 1990).  
It was Francis Galton who argued that the “normal curve” captured something out there in 
the real world, and in his hands descriptive statistics was joined to probability theory and the 
mathematical prediction of complex patterns (Porter 1986). This marriage of statistics and 
mathematics, achieved during the nineteenth century, seemed to help scientists separate the 
descriptive and evaluative senses of “normal.” If “the normal heart” still meant the one that pumped 
blood like it should, it also became possible for it to mean something else: the average heart, which in 
a given population (under specific stresses) might actually be a poor pump indeed. 
Importantly, scientific authors recognized early on that the term “normal” blurred the very 
boundary they sought to shore up. This applied both to particular values on distribution curves and 
to those curves themselves. Thus, Galton could say in 1895 that “it is only a few curves that are 
symmetrical and conform closely to the normal law of facility of error,” concluding: “When the 
conformity between the observations and the normal law ceases to be close, the latter must be applied 
warily” (Galton 1895:319). He was identifying a zeal for “normalizing” that was only beginning. Karl 
Pearson echoed his wariness when discussing “the normal curve, which name, while it avoids an 
international question of priority, has the disadvantage of leading people to believe that all other 
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distributions of frequency are in one sense or another ‘abnormal’” (Pearson 1920). Both Galton and 
Pearson worried about how descriptive and evaluative notions of “normal” ran together.  
Here we see the emergence of statistical “curve fitting” in two competing senses. First, there 
is the sense pursued by Pearson: the effort to fit statistical curves to the data at hand. Second, however, 
there is another sense: the effort to fit the data themselves to an idealized “normal” curve. This latter 
sense is controversial, of course. Its most persistent critic was Michel Foucault, a student of 
Canguilhem. Foucault argued that the term “normal” carried with it a value-laden weight that had the 
power to shape the contexts in which it was used, even if those who wielded the term insisted it had 
only statistical meaning. Over the course of the nineteenth century, this power increased as ideas of 
“normality” were enforced in places like hospitals, schools, and—most famously—prisons (Foucault 
1977 [1975]). It was to Foucault that scholars like Porter and (more explicitly) Hacking looked as they 
unearthed the moral history of “normal” in statistics and everyday life. 
Subsequent work in this vein has proven Pearson’s worries correct. Confusion about what 
“normal” means continued well into the twentieth century. Public opinion polls, for example, built 
“the average American” out of values associated with American-ness in the early- to mid-twentieth 
century (Igo 2007). Other, related developments confirm this continued confusion. The rise of 
“normal controls” in biomedical research, for example, were meant to be “average” but came with their 
own assumptions about ideal body types and the generalizability of male bodies (Stark forthcoming). 
Such studies highlight how difficult it has been to separate the evaluative and descriptive aspects of 
“normality”—which has led some, echoing Canguilhem, to insist that there is no such distinction in 
any meaningful sense (Sholl 2017). 
And yet, something did change in the nineteenth century. This can be illustrated by the gradual 
success of applying statistical methods to the interpretation of human affairs. At the start of the 
nineteenth century, the idea that human behaviors—including crime and suicide—were regular or 
predictable seemed to challenge the idea of free will (Porter 1986). In part, this was because laws like 
those governing astronomical phenomena were thought to be divine expressions of an ideal order 
(hence the very notion of “law”). How could this hold true of suicide? Adolphe Quetelet broke this 
taboo in the 1830s, but he did so by applying such laws only to “the average man” (l’homme moyen), not 
to individual men. This idea, perhaps ironic, shielded Quetelet and his “social physics” from charges 
of immorality and blasphemy (Porter 1985, Porter 1995a). But the door was open for purportedly 
value-free tools to be used on the ultimate value-laden object: society itself. 
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By the end of the century, Emile Durkheim could dispense with Quetelet’s circumspection. 
In his canonical study, Suicide (2002 [1897]), he attributed regularities in this tragic behavior to the 
“normal” distribution of happiness and family values, with “normal” encompassing both positive and 
negative emotions. While this may seem value-laden—and in certain ways, it surely was—it is important 
to note that Durkheim was able to describe a “normal” rate of suicide without running afoul of ideas 
about divine laws or seeming to imply that suicide was “good.” It was a distribution, he could argue, 
and nothing more. What is surprising is that, eventually, people agreed. 
Galton took this one step further. If Quetelet and Durkheim had made it possible to include 
both good and bad under the “normal” umbrella, Galton claimed to identify “normal” ranges that 
were only bad. As one of the founders of the eugenic movement, Galton saw something like “normal 
intelligence” as decidedly less than ideal. Being “only average” was something to be improved upon 
(Hacking 1990). Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century it was possible not only to imagine “the 
normal” as a descriptive, rather than evaluative, claim, but even to imagine it as evaluative in a new 
sense—as less than you might hope for, assuming you wanted to fall further down the curve.  
The point is that, by 1900, the meaning of “normal” had bifurcated. While “normal” still 
implied—and indeed, still implies (Metzl and Kirkland 2010)—a value judgment when it came to one’s 
bodily health, it could also indicate something like “average.” Then, as now, the task was to distinguish 
between the two in scientific contexts, such that statistical tools could be applied for descriptive 
purposes without introducing (or seeming to) value judgments that, by then, seemed to have no place 
in science. While we can identify breaches of these standards today, it is worth noting their emergence 
as a means of indirectly analyzing the role of values in contemporary science.  
 
2.3. Summary and interim conclusion 
Within contemporary science, we find a practice of “normalizing” data that involves 
comparing each data point to the mean. This aspect of contemporary science might at first seem 
perfectly straightforward, but we have argued that it contrasts sharply with what is found in other 
modes of thought. Both in people's ordinary intuitions and in earlier periods in the history of science, 
we find a notion of normality that is determined by a mixture of statistical and evaluative 
considerations. The idea of comparing each data point to a level determined by purely statistical 
considerations, we have suggested, is best understood as a striking innovation, first introduced in the 
19th century. 
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So then, what implications might this claim have for the study of contemporary science? One 
possible answer would be that we could use it as an additional piece of evidence within the kind of 
inquiry that is already quite well-established in the philosophy of science literature. As noted above, 
research in this area has uncovered numerous subtle ways in which value judgments play a role in 
scientific practice. In keeping with this tradition, we might now try to uncover a subtle yet important 
respect in which contemporary science actually does use a value-laden notion of normality. For 
example, existing work in the philosophy of psychiatry has wrestled with how to understand the notion 
of normality used within psychiatry and whether this notion is best understood as a value-laden one 
(see, e.g., Washington, 2016). Perhaps a study of value-laden notions of normality within other modes 
of thought could help to illuminate some of the difficult issues that arise here. 
Now, one possible view would be that it is only when we begin investigating these more subtle 
aspects of scientific practice that our inquiry truly becomes philosophically interesting. After all, it was 
perfectly obvious all along that scientists often normalize their data by comparing each data point to 
the mean. The more interesting question, one might think, is whether scientists sometimes depart 
from this straightforward statistical procedure and begin employing a more value-laden notion. 
There is certainly something right in this view, but we have been trying to show that there is 
also something right in going against it. In a certain sense, it is not surprising at all that scientists 
sometimes make use of a value-laden notion of normality. If we discover, e.g., that the practice of 
psychiatry involves comparing each person to a value-laden standard that is intermediate between the 
statistical average in the prescriptive ideal, we are basically just discovering that psychiatrists do the 
same thing that people do all the time. They are human, after all. 
As such, it is remarkable that scientists even come close to normalizing data using statistics 
alone. For example, it should be seen as remarkable that scientists are able to consider a person who 
watches four hours of TV per day and think of the quantity not as “higher than the normal” but rather 
“about average.” In doing this, they are engaged in a practice that involves a very serious departure 
from ordinary cognition and earlier forms of scientific thought. Somehow scientists are able to use a 
set of procedures that make it possible for them to compare each data point to a standard that is 
derived simply by considering the statistical distribution of the data and does not take into account 




3. Explaining use of the statistical average 
We have been arguing for a change in perspective about what should be taken for granted and 
what calls for explanation. An obvious view would be that we can simply take for granted the fact that 
people sometimes compare data points to the average, and that the only thing that calls for explanation 
is the fact that people sometimes compare data points to a value-laden notion of the normal. We have 
argued against that view. In its place, we argued for a view on which the fact that people ever compare 
data points to the statistical average is what calls for explanation. We now ask what that explanation 
might be. 
The thing that requires explanation here is a certain sort of divergence between the practices 
found in systematic scientific research today and the processes found in people’s more intuitive, 
ordinary cognition or in past scientific research. We will be taking up the effort to explain that 
divergence on two different levels. On a historical level, we want to understand how scientific practice 
diverged in this way from people’s ordinary understanding. Then, at a more contemporary level, we want 
to understand the processes that sustain that divergence today.  
Clearly, the questions we are taking up here touch on some extremely abstract issues about 
the relationship between complex practices sustained by large-scale institutions and the ordinary 
intuitions generated by cognitive processes that take place within individual human minds. Our 
question is about one specific case in which the two appear to diverge, and in what follows, we will 
be focusing entirely on this one specific case. Still, a close examination of this one case has some 
potential to shed light on the more general issue.  
While there are many strands of existing research—both historical and cognitive—that can 
help explain the divergence in this specific case, no single explanation dominates. In what follows, we 
explore a number of different plausible accounts of this divergence that could contribute to the 
indirect approach to values in contemporary science toward which we are pointing. 
 
3.1. Historical Explanations 
Our first question is historical. As our case study shows, scholars have documented a change 
over the course of the nineteenth century—a shift in invocations of “the normal,” away from a value-
laden notion to something more like the statistical average. However, this account was purely 
descriptive. That is, our claim was simply that, with respect to normality, the role of values that one 
finds at the beginning of the nineteenth century differs from the one found at century’s end. But one 
might pose a deeper question: why did scientific practice change in this way? 
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We have already seen two approaches to answering such a question. One is political: Porter, 
for example, argued that the rise of quantification was less about its scientific superiority and more 
about the political power of statistical arguments. Applied to explain the changing meaning of “the 
normal,” this approach would link increasing references to the statistical mean to the rise of a “trust 
in numbers” within political culture. The other is epistemological: Daston and Galison’s “mechanical 
objectivity” stemmed from the impact of Kant’s account of the limits of human knowledge. In order 
to extend this claim to our specific case, Daston and Galison might link the rise of the statistical mean 
(and the fall of more value-laden notions of normality) to a broader distrust of the individual as the 
source of knowledge of ultimate causes. Both approaches would link the shift in normality we have 
documented to shifts in political or epistemological attitudes in the broader culture.  
Of course, one could also look more narrowly at how practices and pedagogy themselves were 
changing in this period. For example, the relative reduction in value-ladenness could be linked to 
technological shifts as well. The development and spread of tabulating machines, mechanical 
calculators, and other aids to computation during the nineteenth century would have made the 
statistical mean of large datasets easier to compute and, eventually, practically ready to hand. Indeed, 
even the dream of such machines played a role in how the human mind was understood and the value 
placed on a range of scientific practices (Jones 2016). The spread of what Ursula Klein has called 
“paper tools”—including specific inscription practices and mathematical formulae shared by 
communities of researchers—no doubt helped make arriving at the statistical mean not only easier 
but also a matter of course as researchers performed specific computations without thinking twice 
(Klein 2001). Such technological shifts explain how value-laden notions of normality could give way 
to more statistical notions without requiring recourse to the kinds of conscious rejection of values 
implied by the political and epistemological shifts traced above.  
Changes in publishing would also have contributed to the shift we are exploring. From the rise 
of the scientific journal as a specific site for publishing (Csiszar 2018) to the development of peer 
review and other mechanisms for standardizing practices in the field (Baldwin 2015), practices such 
as comparing data points to the mean and—eventually—computing z-scores would have become 
expected elements of the scientific paper that was gradually taking more or less its modern form. The 
same goes for calls for replicability in the sciences. As replication became central to adjudicating 
matters of trust and truth, notions of “the normal” that depended upon unarticulated values would 
have been less acceptable than those (supposedly) shorn of those values and limited to comparisons 
one’s colleagues could repeat with their own pen and paper (Cantor and Shuttleworth 2004, Fyfe 
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2012). As science came to be seen as “out there,” embodied in journals and groups but not in 
individuals, it also came to be seen as natural—and, thus, value-free (Cowles 2017). It is easy to see 
how the standardization of publishing forms would have naturalized procedures like comparing data 
to a statistical mean and denaturalized the reliance on value-laden notions of “the normal.”  
The same goes, to take one final example, for changes in scientific training in particular and 
science education in general. Scholars have shown how a new secularism in university education 
(Reuben 1996) and debates over the place of science in such a context (Jewett 2012) paved the way 
for the decline in value-ladenness we have sketched. From the rise of state-based science curricula in 
the nineteenth century to the so-called “general science” movement in the early-twentieth century, 
there emerged a felt need for the kind of standardized practices that anyone could replicate on the 
way to gaining familiarity with scientific fields or specific scientific credentials (White 2003, Rudolph 
2005a, Rudolph 2005b). One notion that gained traction during this shift was the idea of a single, 
shared scientific method based on hypothesis testing (Cowles 2020), which went on to structure how 
basic scientific norms have been taught to children ever since (Rudolph 2019). Something similar may 
well have occurred with regard to the question of comparing data to the average, such that—by the 
turn of the twentieth century—the performance of such computations became definitional for 
rigorous science. Such an explanation could also help explain why this practice became for 
practitioners but relatively rare among others: by identifying science with such a practice, other ways of 
imagining “the normal” would be allowed to persist in areas (including everyday life) not held to the 
same standard.  
In presenting these three specific hypotheses from the work of others, we certainly don’t mean 
to suggest that we already have in hand a complete and accurate explanation of the change over time 
in the role that value judgments play in science in general or the rise of statistical notions of the average 
in particular. Rather, we present these hypotheses to illustrate the sorts of ideas that might be pursued 
in further work.  
 
3.2. Contemporary Explanations 
Another question arises about how to understand the ways in which this departure from other 
modes of thought is sustained within the day-to-day practice of science. Given that people’s ordinary 
intuitive mode of thought seems to involve comparing data points to the normal, how is it possible 
for scientific research to proceed in this very different way, that involves comparing data points to the 
statistical average? 
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One possible view would be that this phenomenon is to be explained in large part in terms of 
cognitive processes taking place within the minds of individual scientists. Within existing work on other 
phenomena, it has often been suggested that even trained scientists retain the same intuitions found 
in non-scientists but that they are able to override these intuitions and rely instead on a process of 
more controlled conscious reasoning (Kelemen, Rottman & Seston, 2013; Shtulman & Valcarcel, 
2012). A similar process might explain scientists’ thinking about the average and the normal. Perhaps 
scientists have an intuitive tendency to compare data points to the normal but they are sometimes able 
to override this tendency and instead compare data points to the statistical average. Of course, this 
type of overriding can only take us so far. Scientists are human beings, and they will inevitably be 
guided in many cases by more ordinary modes of thought. Still, even if scientists only occasionally 
override their ordinary way of applying value judgments, this occasional occurrence should be seen as 
a remarkable and deeply important aspect of scientific practice. 
A second possible view would be that divergences from ordinary thought are sustained in large 
part by the use of technology. Contemporary scientific work involves a complex interplay between 
individual scientists’ minds and external technologies. Indeed, scientific work always has. But the 
nature of that relationship has shifted over time, and specific practices that were once done by hand 
have been offloaded to technologies like computers, with major consequences for the nature of 
scientific thinking. An obvious hypothesis would be that it is in part this interplay that more generally 
makes possible certain kinds of divergence from more ordinary modes of thought. Perhaps this type 
of hypothesis can also explain people's use of the statistical average 
At the most basic level, there is the fact that people do not need to calculate the average in 
their heads; they can do the calculations using a pencil and paper. Thus, a person might determine that 
a given data point is above the average, but the process used to make that determination does not take 
place entirely within the person’s own head. Rather, the determination is a product of a interplay 
between processes taking place within the person’s head and processes taking place in an external 
technology (the pencil and paper). In this way, the process of comparing data points to the statistical 
average is quite different from the process usually used to determine whether something falls above 
or below the normal. 
But of course, in much work within contemporary science, the reliance on external technology 
is far more extensive. For example, to calculate a correlation coefficient, one needs to compare each 
data point to the average, but it is not as though scientists typically go through this process using pencil 
and paper. Almost always, the process is executed by a computer, and on many occasions, the scientists 
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aren’t thinking at all about the actual computations the computer is carrying out. The result is a striking 
divergence between what is happening within science and what is happening within the heads of 
individual scientists. Science relies on a procedure that involves comparing data points to the average, 
but this does not mean that there needs to be any process at all in which individual scientists compare 
data points to the average. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, there is the social character of science. Scientific progress 
is not usually the product of an individual scientist working in isolation. Instead, scientists typically 
work in teams, and there is usually a structure set up such that each team will not be successful unless 
its work is accepted by other teams. An individual scientist may have her own cherished values, but 
she will also be embedded in a larger structure that is set up in such a way that her work cannot succeed 
without the blessing of various other people, many of whom will have quite different values.  
Suppose now that each individual scientist has certain values but that different scientists have 
different values. Each individual scientist might show a tendency to develop an understanding of the 
normal that is deeply informed by her own values, but as long as other scientists do not share those 
values, the social character of science may lead to an outcome in which her published work is not 
simply a reflection of her own tendencies. Thus, even if each individual scientist shows a tendency to 
use something like the ordinary notion of the normal, science as a whole might be drawn toward 
practices that more closely approximate a purely statistical notion of the average. 
Finally, we might consider hypotheses that combine a number of these factors together. One 
of the most appealing such hypotheses would be that (a) there is a mechanism within the minds of 
individual scientists that allows them to use a purely statistical notion of the average but that (b) this 
mechanism is created or sustained by a process that requires either external technology or the social 
character of science.  
To give a simple analogy, studies have shown that people who frequently do arithmetic by 
using an abacus eventually acquire the ability to do arithmetic in their minds using what is called a 
“mental abacus” (Frank & Barner, 2012). In much the same way, it might be that people first acquire 
the ability to think in terms of a purely statistical average either by using technology or by relying on 
the social character of science. However, as people continue using this method, it might be that they 
eventually come to be able to conceptualize things in a purely statistical way even without relying in 
the moment on either extra technology or external social connections. The extent to which scientists 
actually are able to do this is, of course, an open and very interesting empirical question. 
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4. Conclusion.  
Our inquiry has been concerned with the practice of comparing data points to the statistical 
average. We argued that evidence from cognitive science and from the history of science gives us 
reason to regard this practice as highly surprising. The fact that this practice exists at all should be seen 
as something that calls for explanation, and we have sketched a number of possible ways to explain it. 
Although we have focused very narrowly just on questions about the use of the statistical 
average, the approach introduced here could potentially be applied to numerous other problems. To 
give just one example, consider the notion of essence. Work on contemporary science suggests that 
scientists might make use of a notion of ‘causal essentialism,’ in which essences are understood as 
hidden factors that causally explain observable features (Putnam, 1975). But within work in the 
cognitive science of ordinary judgments and in the history of science, there is growing evidence of a 
more value-laden notion of essentialism (for cognitive science evidence, see Bailey, Knobe, & 
Newman, forthcoming; Gelman & Rhodes, 2012; Newman & Knobe, 2018; for historical evidence, 
see Daston & Galison, 2007; Dear 2014; Hacking 2007; Müller-Wille, 2013). Thus, there is at least 
some reason to think that we might face a real question as to why the understanding of essence at 
work in contemporary science departs from people’s ordinary understanding of essence. 
More generally, existing research has furnished us with an enormous amount of information 
about the role of values in contemporary science and also, separately, about the role of values in the 
processes at work ordinarily in people’s minds. A key task now will be to bring those two literatures 
together. Looking across a whole range of different concepts, we need to explore the ways in which 
the role of value in contemporary science might depart from the role of value in more ordinary 
thinking. Ultimately, then, our inquiry into the average and the normal is perhaps best understood as 
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